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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been 
analyzing and reporting on contract spending for national security and across the federal 
government. This presentation analyzes contracting for products, services, and research and 
development (R&D) by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its key components. It 
provides an in-depth look at the trends currently driving nearly 70% of all federal contract 
dollars throughout the growth and subsequent inflection of defense spending of the 2000– 
2013 study period. This data will be analyzed in greater detail in the FY2013 update of the 
study team’s series of reports on Defense Contract Trends, to be released later this spring. 
Throughout the year, the study team will publish and update the data underlying shorter 
publications on key issues relevant to the defense-industrial base. 
 
Introduction 
This presentation, with notes, is submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School for the 
proceedings of the 11th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium. The charts contained 
herein may be updated or modified for actual presentation at the symposium. As is true for 
all CSIS analysis, the views represented in this presentation are those of the project team, 
not CSIS as an institution. 
This analysis covers the period from 2000–2013. For the purposes of this analysis, 
all years discussed are fiscal years, and all dollar figures are in constant 2013 billions. See 
the Methodology section on page 11 for more details. 
This presentation provides CSIS analysis of nine key facets of the defense industrial 
base:  
• Defense component 
• Product/service area 
• Competition (Overall and by component) 
• Contract pricing mechanism 
• Contract vehicle 
• Contract size 
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• Vendor size 




       Defense Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 1) breaks down defense contract obligations by major DoD 
component: Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and “Other DoD.” 
“Other DoD” is a category that includes all contracting entities within the DoD that are not 
captured in the other four components, such as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), 
TRICARE, and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). 
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       Defense Contract Obligations by Area, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 2) breaks down defense contract obligations by what is being 
purchased, using government Product or Service Codes (PSCs) to group contract 
obligations into three categories: products, services, and research & development (R&D). 
The study team utilizes the classifications made by the DoD and entered into FPDS, which 
may differ from how vendors classify certain contracts. For example, a support contract that 
the vendor classifies as a services contract could be classified by the government as a 
products contract. 
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       Defense Contract Obligations by Competition, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 3) breaks down defense contract obligations by level of 
competition. The CSIS study team defines “effective competition” as competitions-awarded 
contracts that receive two or more offers. The study team believes that, all else being equal, 
contracts that receive more offers are more likely to receive the expected benefits of 
competition. The taxonomy used by CSIS to categorize contracts by competition can be 




       Defense Contract Obligations Awarded With Competitive Procedures, by 
Component, 2003 & 2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
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This chart (Figure 4) further breaks down competition trends for DoD contract 
obligations, showing the share of contract obligations within each major DoD component 
(Army, Navy, Air Force, DLA, and “Other DoD”) awarded with competitive procedures; the 
dashed black line provides the rate for overall DoD, for context. This includes competed 
contract obligations receiving any number of offers, as opposed to “effective competition,” 
which only includes those contracts awarded after competition with two or more offers. Note 




       Defense Contract Obligations by Contract Pricing Mechanism, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 5) breaks down defense contract obligations by the following 
contract pricing mechanisms: fixed price, cost reimbursement, time and materials, and 
combination. Combination contracts are those which contain both fixed price and cost 
reimbursement elements; guidance in recent years has significantly reduced the use of this 
classification. 
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       Defense Contract Obligations by Contract Vehicle, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 6) breaks down defense contract obligations by the following 
contract vehicle types: definitive contracts, purchase orders, single award IDCs, multiple 
award IDCs, and “FSS or other IDVs.” The “FSS or other IDV” category includes various 
special-purpose indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs), such as blanket purchasing agreements 
(BPAs) and government-wide acquisition contracts (GWACs). 
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       Defense Contract Obligations by Contract Size, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
Note. For clarity, this chart excludes de-obligations, which results in the totals for each year 
being higher than in the other charts in this brief. 
This chart (Figure 7) breaks down defense contract obligations by size of contract. 
For the purposes of this analysis, contract size is defined by total annual obligations under a 
contract in a given year. Thus, a single contract could qualify under different size categories 
in different years, depending on the amount of obligations under that contract in that fiscal 
year. The categories are: less than $250 thousand; $250 thousand to less than $1 million; 
$1 million to less than $25 million; $25 million to less than $100 million; $100 million to less 
than $500 million; and greater than $500 million. 
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       Defense Contract Obligations by Vendor Size, 2000–2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
This chart (Figure 8) breaks down defense contract obligations by size of vendor. To 
analyze the breakdown of competitors in the market into small, medium, and large vendors, 
the study team assigned each vendor in the database to one of four size categories. Any 
organization designated as small by the FPDS database—according to the criteria 
established by the federal government—was categorized as such unless the vendor was a 
known subsidiary of a larger entity. Vendors with annual revenue of more than $3 billion, 
including from non-federal sources, are classified as large. The Big 6 is a subset of “large,” 
separating out the six largest defense firms (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, 
General Dynamics, Raytheon, and BAE). Medium is any contractor which qualifies as 
neither small nor large. Unlabeled vendors are those that cannot be categorized on the 
basis of the unique identifier they have been assigned, for example “miscellaneous foreign 
vendors” or “classified domestic contractors.” 
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Table 1. Top 20 Defense Department Contractors, 2003 & 2013 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System; CSIS analysis) 
 
 
* - Joint Venture 
Table 1 shows the Top 20 defense contractors in both 2003 and 2013. This analysis 
counts only prime contract dollars; the available data for subcontractor contract obligations 
has historically reported totals well below the expected volume of subcontract obligations. 
The two “Rank” columns (to the right of the respective “Obligations” columns) show where 
that contractor ranked in the previous fiscal year (in 2002 and 2012, respectively). 
 
Methodology 
The following methodological notes apply to the CSIS analysis that underlies all of 
the charts in this presentation, except where noted. Comments and questions are welcome, 
and can be directed to Jesse Ellman at jellman@csis.org. 
• The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) was the primary source for 
this report. 
• Federal regulations only require that all unclassified prime contracts worth 
$2,500 and above be reported to FPDS. 
• FPDS data are constantly being updated, including those for back years. As a 
consequence, the dollar totals for a given year can vary between reports. 
• Contract classifications sometimes differ between FPDS and individual 
companies, resulting in some contracts that a company considers as services 
being labeled as products by FPDS and vice versa. 
• Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and other supplemental funding 
appropriations are not separately classified in FPDS. 
• All dollar figures are in constant 2013 dollars. 
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• A full explanation of the methodology used in this analysis, along with charts 




At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions to 
decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. 
A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC, CSIS conducts 
research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate 
change. 
Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold 
War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and 
prosperity as a force for good in the world. 
Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international 
policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars 
focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging 
from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. 
Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 
1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 
April 2000. 
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this 
presentation should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 
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